TY - GEN
T1 - Addressing the shortcomings of one-way chains
AU - Di Pietro, Roberto
AU - Mancini, Luigi V.
AU - Durante, Antonio
AU - Patil, Vishwas
N1 - Generated from Scopus record by KAUST IRTS on 2023-09-20
PY - 2006/12/1
Y1 - 2006/12/1
N2 - One-way hash chains have been the preferred choice, over the symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography, in security setups where efficiency mattered; despite the ephemeral confidentiality and authentication they assure. Known constructions of one-way chains (for example, SHA-1 based), only ensure the forward secrecy and have limitations over their length i.e., a priori, knowledge of chain's length is necessary before constructing it. In this paper, we will see how our approach, based on chameleon functions, leads to the generation of practically unbounded one-way chains with constant storage and computational requirements. We provide the construction and advantages of our proposal with the help of a secure group communication setup. We also provide the implementation details of our construction and argue its suitability for security setups, where one cannot a priori determine the longevity of the setup. Copyright 2006 ACM.
AB - One-way hash chains have been the preferred choice, over the symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography, in security setups where efficiency mattered; despite the ephemeral confidentiality and authentication they assure. Known constructions of one-way chains (for example, SHA-1 based), only ensure the forward secrecy and have limitations over their length i.e., a priori, knowledge of chain's length is necessary before constructing it. In this paper, we will see how our approach, based on chameleon functions, leads to the generation of practically unbounded one-way chains with constant storage and computational requirements. We provide the construction and advantages of our proposal with the help of a secure group communication setup. We also provide the implementation details of our construction and argue its suitability for security setups, where one cannot a priori determine the longevity of the setup. Copyright 2006 ACM.
UR - https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1128817.1128860
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34247356209&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/1128817.1128860
DO - 10.1145/1128817.1128860
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 1595932720
SP - 289
EP - 296
BT - Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIACCS '06
ER -