COKE crypto-less over-the-air key establishment

Roberto Di Pietro*, Gabriele Oligeri

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we present a novel probabilistic protocol (COKE) to allow two wireless communicating parties to commit over-the-air (OTA) on a shared secret, even in the presence of a globally eavesdropping adversary. The proposed solution leverages no crypto but just plaintext messages exchange. Indeed, the security of the solution relies on the difficulty for the adversary to correctly identify, for each one-bit transmission, the sender of that bit - not its value, which is indeed exchanged in cleartext. Due to the low requirements of COKE (essentially, the capability to send a few wireless messages), it is particularly suited for resource constrained wireless devices (e.g., WNSs, wireless embedded systems), as well as for those scenarios where just energy saving is at premium, such as smartphones.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number6341830
Pages (from-to)163-173
Number of pages11
JournalIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Volume8
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013

Keywords

  • anonymous channels
  • key-establishment
  • Wireless security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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