Fragility and robust design of optimal auctions

Georgios Kotsalis; Jeff S. Shamma

doi:10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736531

Fragility and robust design of optimal auctions

Georgios Kotsalis, Jeff S. Shamma

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

We consider the fragility problem of optimal auctions under a general class of preference relations and type spaces. We show that in generic settings feasibility of optimal auctions relies on the principals exact knowledge of the preference relations of the bidders. In the absence of such exact knowledge, a self-interested bidder will find it profitable to either misreport her private information or not participate at the auction. This phenomenon is a manifestation of fragility. Given this limitation we design auctions that are robust to model misspecification by leveraging tools from robust optimization, while maintaining computational tractability.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society
Pages	248-253
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Print)	9781479934096
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736531
State	Published - 2013
Externally published	Yes
Event	51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 - Monticello, IL, United States Duration: Oct 2 2013 → Oct 4 2013

Other

Other	51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013
Country/Territory	United States
City	Monticello, IL
Period	10/2/13 → 10/4/13

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Networks and Communications
Control and Systems Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736531

Cite this

@inproceedings{b699ef16c1f6404f9ef125c7d21e54e0,

title = "Fragility and robust design of optimal auctions",

abstract = "We consider the fragility problem of optimal auctions under a general class of preference relations and type spaces. We show that in generic settings feasibility of optimal auctions relies on the principals exact knowledge of the preference relations of the bidders. In the absence of such exact knowledge, a self-interested bidder will find it profitable to either misreport her private information or not participate at the auction. This phenomenon is a manifestation of fragility. Given this limitation we design auctions that are robust to model misspecification by leveraging tools from robust optimization, while maintaining computational tractability.",

author = "Georgios Kotsalis and Shamma, {Jeff S.}",

year = "2013",

doi = "10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736531",

language = "English (US)",

isbn = "9781479934096",

pages = "248--253",

booktitle = "2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013",

publisher = "IEEE Computer Society",

address = "United States",

note = "51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 ; Conference date: 02-10-2013 Through 04-10-2013",

}

Kotsalis, G & Shamma, JS 2013, Fragility and robust design of optimal auctions. in 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013., 6736531, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 248-253, 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013, Monticello, IL, United States, 10/2/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736531

TY - GEN

T1 - Fragility and robust design of optimal auctions

AU - Kotsalis, Georgios

AU - Shamma, Jeff S.

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - We consider the fragility problem of optimal auctions under a general class of preference relations and type spaces. We show that in generic settings feasibility of optimal auctions relies on the principals exact knowledge of the preference relations of the bidders. In the absence of such exact knowledge, a self-interested bidder will find it profitable to either misreport her private information or not participate at the auction. This phenomenon is a manifestation of fragility. Given this limitation we design auctions that are robust to model misspecification by leveraging tools from robust optimization, while maintaining computational tractability.

AB - We consider the fragility problem of optimal auctions under a general class of preference relations and type spaces. We show that in generic settings feasibility of optimal auctions relies on the principals exact knowledge of the preference relations of the bidders. In the absence of such exact knowledge, a self-interested bidder will find it profitable to either misreport her private information or not participate at the auction. This phenomenon is a manifestation of fragility. Given this limitation we design auctions that are robust to model misspecification by leveraging tools from robust optimization, while maintaining computational tractability.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84897677676&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736531

DO - 10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736531

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84897677676

SN - 9781479934096

SP - 248

EP - 253

BT - 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013

PB - IEEE Computer Society

T2 - 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013

Y2 - 2 October 2013 through 4 October 2013

ER -

Fragility and robust design of optimal auctions

Abstract

Other

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this