Honeypots: Practical means to validate malicious fault assumptions

Marc Dacier, Fabien Pouget, Hervé Debar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

29 Scopus citations


In this paper, we report on an experiment run with several honeypots for 4 months. The motivation of this work resides in our wish to use data collected by honeypots to validate fault assumptions required when designing intrusion-tolerant systems. This work in progress establishes the foundations for a feasibility study into that direction. After a review of the state of the art with respect to honeypots, we present our test bed, discuss results obtained and lessons learned Avenues for future work are also proposed.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing
Number of pages6
StatePublished - Jun 15 2004
Externally publishedYes


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