Abstract
Time-triggered real-time systems achieve deterministic behaviour, making them suitable for safety-critical environments. However, this determinism also allows attackers to finetune attacks after studying the system behaviour through side channels, targeting safety-critical victim tasks. Assuming fault independence, replication tolerates both random and malicious faults of up to f replicas. Yet, directed attacks violate the fault independence assumption. This violation possibly gives attackers the edge to compromise more than f replicas simultaneously, in particular if they can mount the attack from already compromised components. In this paper, we sketch mitigation strategies for time-triggered systems with task replication to withstand directed timing attacks and show preliminary results on their effectiveness and practicality.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings - 2018 IEEE 24th International Conference on Embedded and Real-Time Computing Systems and Applications, RTCSA 2018 |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Pages | 232-233 |
Number of pages | 2 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781538677599 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 9 2019 |
Externally published | Yes |