MASS: An efficient and secure broadcast authentication scheme for resource constrained devices

Message authentication for resource constrained devices is a challenging topic. Indeed, given the scarceness of on-board resources, solutions that do not rely on asymmetric key cryptography are in demand. A few solutions to address this issue have been proposed, and some have gained the status of state of the art thanks to their effectiveness and efficiency. However, even if state of the art solutions do provide sender-receiver on-the-fly message authentication, they are not able to tackle a few relevant attacks on received messages when the time dimension is taken into account. In particular, we first introduce two types of attacks: the switch command attack (where an adversary pretends to 'switch' two messages over time - that is, altering the relative time ordering), and the drop command attack (where an adversary could pretend not having received a message previously sent from the legitimate sender). We then propose a new solution for broadcast authentication that copes with the above introduced attacks: MASS. Our analysis shows that MASS is effective in detecting both switch command and drop command attacks. © 2013 IEEE.