Mean-field games for marriage

Dario Bauso; Ben Mansour Dia; Boualem Djehiche; Hamidou Tembine; Raul Tempone

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933

Mean-field games for marriage

Dario Bauso, Ben Mansour Dia, Boualem Djehiche, Hamidou Tembine, Raul Tempone

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11 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article examines mean-field games for marriage. The results support the argument that optimizing the long-term well-being through effort and social feeling state distribution (mean-field) will help to stabilize marriage. However, if the cost of effort is very high, the couple fluctuates in a bad feeling state or the marriage breaks down. We then examine the influence of society on a couple using mean-field sentimental games. We show that, in mean-field equilibrium, the optimal effort is always higher than the one-shot optimal effort. We illustrate numerically the influence of the couple's network on their feeling states and their well-being. © 2014 Bauso et al.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	e94933
Journal	PLoS ONE
Volume	9
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0094933
State	Published - May 7 2014

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
General Medicine

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10.1371/journal.pone.0094933

https://repository.kaust.edu.sa/bitstream/10754/334563/1/Article-PLoS_ONE-Mean-field-2014.pdf

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title = "Mean-field games for marriage",

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AB - This article examines mean-field games for marriage. The results support the argument that optimizing the long-term well-being through effort and social feeling state distribution (mean-field) will help to stabilize marriage. However, if the cost of effort is very high, the couple fluctuates in a bad feeling state or the marriage breaks down. We then examine the influence of society on a couple using mean-field sentimental games. We show that, in mean-field equilibrium, the optimal effort is always higher than the one-shot optimal effort. We illustrate numerically the influence of the couple's network on their feeling states and their well-being. © 2014 Bauso et al.

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Mean-field games for marriage

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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