TY - JOUR
T1 - Perfect secrecy cryptography via mixing of chaotic waves in irreversible time-varying silicon chips.
AU - Di Falco, A
AU - Mazzone, Valerio
AU - Cruz, A
AU - Fratalocchi, Andrea
N1 - KAUST Repository Item: Exported on 2020-10-01
Acknowledged KAUST grant number(s): OSR-2016-CRG5-2995
Acknowledgements: A.D.F. acknowledges support from EPSRC (EP/L017008/1). A.F. acknowledges support from KAUST (OSR-2016-CRG5-2995). The research data underpinning this publication can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.17630/19156fc3-cc1f-4ee3-b553-f02042cf89a0.
PY - 2019/12/20
Y1 - 2019/12/20
N2 - Protecting confidential data is a major worldwide challenge. Classical cryptography is fast and scalable, but is broken by quantum algorithms. Quantum cryptography is unclonable, but requires quantum installations that are more expensive, slower, and less scalable than classical optical networks. Here we show a perfect secrecy cryptography in classical optical channels. The system exploits correlated chaotic wavepackets, which are mixed in inexpensive and CMOS compatible silicon chips. The chips can generate 0.1 Tbit of different keys for every mm of length of the input channel, and require the transmission of an amount of data that can be as small as 1/1000 of the message's length. We discuss the security of this protocol for an attacker with unlimited technological power, and who can access the system copying any of its part, including the chips. The second law of thermodynamics and the exponential sensitivity of chaos unconditionally protect this scheme against any possible attack.
AB - Protecting confidential data is a major worldwide challenge. Classical cryptography is fast and scalable, but is broken by quantum algorithms. Quantum cryptography is unclonable, but requires quantum installations that are more expensive, slower, and less scalable than classical optical networks. Here we show a perfect secrecy cryptography in classical optical channels. The system exploits correlated chaotic wavepackets, which are mixed in inexpensive and CMOS compatible silicon chips. The chips can generate 0.1 Tbit of different keys for every mm of length of the input channel, and require the transmission of an amount of data that can be as small as 1/1000 of the message's length. We discuss the security of this protocol for an attacker with unlimited technological power, and who can access the system copying any of its part, including the chips. The second law of thermodynamics and the exponential sensitivity of chaos unconditionally protect this scheme against any possible attack.
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10754/660901
UR - http://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-13740-y
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85076882176&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1038/s41467-019-13740-y
DO - 10.1038/s41467-019-13740-y
M3 - Article
C2 - 31862881
SN - 2041-1723
VL - 10
JO - Nature communications
JF - Nature communications
IS - 1
ER -