@inproceedings{544875ab039e4a9d8f590b3aa3be4d76,
title = "Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation",
abstract = "The theory of learning in games has sought to understand how and why equilibria emerge in non-cooperative games. Traditionally, social science literature develops descriptive game theoretic models for players, analyzes the limiting behavior, and generalizes the results for larger classes of games. Recently, there has been a significant amount of research seeking to understand these behavioral models not from a descriptive point of view, but rather from a prescriptive point of view [1]-[4]. The goal is to use these behavioral models as a prescriptive control approach in distributed multi-agent systems where the guaranteed limiting behavior would represent a desirable operating condition.",
author = "Marden, {Jason R.} and Shamma, {Jeff S.}",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1109/ALLERTON.2010.5707044",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781424482146",
series = "2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010",
pages = "1171--1172",
booktitle = "2010 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010",
note = "48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2010 ; Conference date: 29-09-2010 Through 01-10-2010",
}