TY - GEN
T1 - ScriptGen: An automated script generation tool for honeyd
AU - Leita, Corrado
AU - Mermoud, Ken
AU - Dacier, Marc
N1 - Generated from Scopus record by KAUST IRTS on 2022-09-12
PY - 2005/12/1
Y1 - 2005/12/1
N2 - Honeyd [14] is a popular tool developed by Niels Proves that offers a simple way to emulate services offered by several machines on a single PC. It is a so called low interaction honeypot. Responses to incoming requests are generated thanks to ad-hoc scripts that need to be written by hand. As a result, few scripts exist, especially for services handling proprietary protocols. In this paper, we propose a method to alleviate these problems by automatically generating new scripts. We explain the method and describe its limitations. We analyze the quality of the generated scripts thanks to two different methods. On the one hand, we have launched known attacks against a machine running our scripts; on the other hand, we have deployed that machine on the Internet, next to a high interaction honeypot during two months. For those attackers that have targeted both machines, we can verify if our scripts have, or not, been able to fool them. We also discuss the various tuning parameters of the algorithm that can be set to either increase the quality of the script or, at the contrary, to reduce its complexity. © 2005 IEEE.
AB - Honeyd [14] is a popular tool developed by Niels Proves that offers a simple way to emulate services offered by several machines on a single PC. It is a so called low interaction honeypot. Responses to incoming requests are generated thanks to ad-hoc scripts that need to be written by hand. As a result, few scripts exist, especially for services handling proprietary protocols. In this paper, we propose a method to alleviate these problems by automatically generating new scripts. We explain the method and describe its limitations. We analyze the quality of the generated scripts thanks to two different methods. On the one hand, we have launched known attacks against a machine running our scripts; on the other hand, we have deployed that machine on the Internet, next to a high interaction honeypot during two months. For those attackers that have targeted both machines, we can verify if our scripts have, or not, been able to fool them. We also discuss the various tuning parameters of the algorithm that can be set to either increase the quality of the script or, at the contrary, to reduce its complexity. © 2005 IEEE.
UR - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1565248/
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33846316416&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CSAC.2005.49
DO - 10.1109/CSAC.2005.49
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 0769524613
SP - 203
EP - 214
BT - Proceedings - Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC
ER -