Abstract
This paper explores estimating Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) when agents are strategic and privacy-conscious. We aim to design mechanisms that encourage truthful reporting, protect privacy, and ensure outputs are close to the true parameters. Initially, we address models with sub-Gaussian covariates and heavy-tailed responses with finite fourth moments, proposing a novel private, closed-form estimator. Our mechanism features: (1) o(1)-joint differential privacy with high probability; (2) o([Formula presented])-approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium for (1−o(1))-fraction of agents; (3) o(1) error in parameter estimation; (4) individual rationality for (1−o(1)) of agents; (5) o(1) payment budget. We then extend our approach to linear regression with heavy-tailed data, using an ℓ4-norm shrinkage operator to propose a similar estimator and payment scheme.
Original language | English (US) |
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Article number | 105225 |
Journal | Information and Computation |
Volume | 301 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2024 |
Keywords
- Bayesian game
- Differential privacy
- Generalized linear models
- Truthful mechanism design
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Information Systems
- Computer Science Applications
- Computational Theory and Mathematics